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The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that war-
rants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced
if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy
within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans
and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence,
or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the
simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of
heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform.
On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between hetero-
geneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen
randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally
augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of
coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.
Unlike interactions among bacteria, plants or viruses [1–
4], interactions among humans and social animals are often
driven not solely, or even not at all, by a desire to maximize fit-
ness, but rather with an aim to socialize, to fit in, or to identify
oneself with a group of like-minded individuals [5, 6]. This is
somewhat at odds with the main determinant of success in the
realm of evolutionary games [7–10], where fitness, most often
quantified by a scalar payoff, reigns supreme as the key target
to maximize. To take this into account, conformity has been
considered as an alternative to straightforward payoff maxi-
mization, the main idea being to adopt not the strategy that is
the most profitable, but the strategy that is the most common
in the group or within ones interaction range [11–16].
Since social interactions are traditionally described by
models entailing networks [17–21], evolutionary games on
networks and structured populations in general have received
ample attention in the recent past [22–25]. This avenue of
research owes its heyday to network reciprocity, which was
discovered by Nowak and May [26], and has since been pro-
moted as one of the key mechanisms for cooperation in evo-
lutionary social dilemmas [27]. Follow-up research, mainly
in the realm of statistical physics, has focused on small-world
[28], scale-free [29], coevolving [30, 31], hierarchical [32],
bipartite [33], and in the past couple of years also on mul-
tilayer networks [34–36]. Mechanical Turk [37] and related
advances in online recruitment and large-scale data analysis
have also paved the way towards social experiments to test
various theoretical predictions [38–40].
Here we wish to extend the scope of evolutionary games
[41–46] in structured populations by considering social dilem-
mas, and notably the prisoner’s dilemma game as the most
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commonly used workhorse to that effect [47–64], with ran-
domly assigned as well as player-specific conformity. As
noted previously, this entails the adoption of the strategy that
is most common within the interaction range of the player, re-
gardless of the expected payoff [65]. By adopting the most
common strategy, conformists coordinate their behavior in a
way that minimizes individual risk and ensures that their pay-
off will not be much lower than average. Importantly, a re-
cent economic experiment involving the public goods game
with institutionalized incentives has confirmed such behavior
[66]. In addition to randomly assigned conformity [16], we
consider degree, collective influence [67], as well as teaching
activity [68] as criteria to determine which players conform
and which aspire to payoff maximization. As we will show,
regardless of which criterion is applied, for socially desirable
outcomes with ample cooperation leaders should not be con-
formists.
Results
Evolutionary games with conformists
We consider evolutionary social dilemmas on either the
scale-free or the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network (see Methods
for details), or on interaction networks with a uniform degree
distributions, such as the random regular graph and the square
lattice, where each player x is initially designated either as co-
operator (C) or defector (D) with equal probability. Each in-
stance of the game involves a pairwise interaction where mu-
tual cooperation yields the reward R, mutual defection leads
to punishment P , and the mixed choice gives the cooperator
the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation T . We
predominantly consider the weak prisoner’s dilemma, such
that T > 1, R = 1 and P = S = 0, but we also consider
the true prisoner’s dilemma where S < 0.
2The standard Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprises
the following elementary steps. First, according to a random
sequential update protocol, a randomly selected player x ac-
quires its payoff Πx by playing the game with all its neigh-
bors. Next, player x randomly chooses one neighbor y, who
then also acquires its payoff Πy in the same way as previously
player x. To avoid payoff-related effects that are due to het-
erogeneous interaction topologies [29], we normalize the pay-
off with the degree of the corresponding player Π˜x = Πx/kx.
After both players acquire their payoffs, player x adopts the
strategy sy from player y with a probability determined by the
Fermi function
Γ(Π˜x − Π˜y) =
1
1 + exp((Π˜x − Π˜y)/K)
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strat-
egy adoption process [22, 69]. In agreement with previous
works, the selected value ensures that strategies of better-
performing players are readily adopted by their neighbors, al-
though adopting the strategy of a player that performs worse
is also possible [70, 71]. This accounts for imperfect infor-
mation, errors in the evaluation of the opponent, and similar
unpredictable factors.
To introduce conformity, we designate a fraction ρ of the
population as being conformity-driven, which influences the
strategy adoption rule. Instead of Eq. 1, if player x is a con-
formist, we use
Γ(Nsx − kh) =
1
1 + exp((Nsx − kh)/K)
, (2)
where Nsx is the number of players adopting strategy sx
within the interaction range of player x, while kh is one half of
the degree of player x. By using Eq. 2, player x is most likely
to adopt the strategy that is, at the time, the most common
in its neighborhood. As in Eq. 1, here too K = 0.1 intro-
duces some uncertainty to the process, such that it is not com-
pletely impossible for a conformist to adopt a strategy that is
in the minority among its neighbors. If, however, the number
of cooperators and defectors in the neighborhood is equal, the
conformity-driven player will change its strategy with proba-
bility 1/2. We also emphasize that, in this study, a conformist
uses only local information. In particular, a conformity-driven
player simply tends to follow the majority in its local neigh-
borhood. An alternative approach might entail a conformist
having available global information about the whole popula-
tion and act accordingly. In such a case, however, the global
information may likely suppress the vital importance of local
information stemming from the direct neighbors. Due to sev-
eral open questions and options on implementation, we leave
it to future studies to determine the merits of global confor-
mity.
A key consideration in this paper is which players make up
the fraction ρ of the population that act as conformists. We
consider and compare several different options. The simplest
option is to assign conformists uniformly at random, which
we use as the benchmark case. Secondly, on heterogeneous
interaction networks, such as scale-free and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi ran-
dom networks, we use the degree kx of each player, whereby
the probability to be designated as a conformist can be ei-
ther kx/kmax or 1−kx/kmax for degree-related or inversely-
degree-related assignment, respectively. In the former case,
high-degree players, i.e., the hubs or leaders, most certainly
end up as conformists, while in the latter case low-degree
players, i.e., the masses or the periphery, are the most likely
conformists. Thirdly, again of relevance on heterogeneous
networks, we use the concept of collective influence of players
to distinguish them [67]. In particular, we calculate the col-
lective influence CIx at depth 1 for every player x (see [67]
for details), where the maximal value is CImax. The incen-
tive for player x to act as a conformist is then simply based on
the ratio CIx/CImax. Accordingly, players with the highest
collective influence at depth 1 in the network will most likely
end up using Eq. 2 rather than Eq. 1 for the strategy adoption.
In principle, this approach is the same as the degree-related
assignment of conformity, in that the leaders are the likeliest
to conform. Lastly, we check our observations on homoge-
neous networks, where all players have an identical number
of neighbors. Instead of considering topological differences,
we thus assign a different strategy pass capacity wx to each
player as a pre-factor in Eq. 1 [68], such that the distribution
is P (w) ∝ w 12 , where wx ∈ [0.01, 1] interval. This prac-
tically means that the majority of the players has a very low
wx value, while only a few have wx ≈ 1 (the distribution is
shown in the inset of Fig. 4). As with the degree, we con-
sider w-related (the probability is simply equal to wx because
wmax = 1) or inversely-w-related (1-wx) assignment of con-
formity, such that the leaders or the masses are preferentially
considered as conformists, respectively.
Evolutionary dynamics
We begin by presenting the main results on scale-free net-
works in Fig. 1, where we show how the fraction of coop-
erators (fC) in the stationary state depends on the fraction ρ
of the whole population that is made up of conformist play-
ers. As stated in the Introduction, these players do not aspire
to maximal payoffs as is traditionally assumed in evolution-
ary games, but rather, they prefer to adopt the most common
strategy within their interaction range. As we have reported
in [16], when conformity is assigned randomly and to a suf-
ficiently high fraction of the population, the spatial selection
for cooperation is enhanced, and the level of cooperation in
the stationary state is higher than in the absence of conformist
players. Results presented in Fig. 1 show, however, that this
effect can be either enhanced or destroyed based on the pref-
erence of who will be made to conform. Specifically, if con-
formists are players with a high degree or high collective in-
fluence in the network, the evolution of cooperation is signif-
icantly impaired. The constructive interplay between hetero-
geneity and coordination is almost completely lost. Naturally,
we can still observe a gradual increase of fC as the fraction of
conformists increases, but this is just a simple consequence of
the fact that we reach a strategy neutral state at ρ = 1.
On the other hand, if conformists are preferentially selected
from low-degree players, i.e., from the masses, then an even
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the fraction ρ of
the population that act as conformists, as obtained on the scale-free
network for different selection rules indicated in the legend. Assign-
ing the conformist status to players with the highest degree (degree)
or collective influence (collective) in the scale-free network strongly
impairs the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordi-
nation, thus leading to lower levels of cooperation than are obtained
if the same status is assigned randomly (uniform) or to low-ranking
players (inverse). Scale-free networks with N = 104 nodes and
the weak prisoner’s dilemma (T, S) = (1.1, 0) parametrization have
been used. Presented results are averages over 5000 independent re-
alizations.
higher level of cooperation in the stationary state is attain-
able, indicating an optimization of the aforementioned inter-
play. This result is intuitive and understandable, because high-
degree players are naturally in a position to influence a large
neighborhood, and the effectiveness of this influence is facil-
itated further if the neighborhood is made up predominantly
of conformist players. This interplay of heterogeneity (the
ability of a small number of select players, i.e., the leaders,
having a wide influence) and coordination (the pressure of
conformity to select the most common strategy, even if it is
not payoff-maximizing) ultimately leads to large homogenous
groups or clusters competing in the population, which in the
long-run reveals the benefits of cooperation by virtue of net-
work reciprocity. Naturally, this argument fails if leaders are
made to conform because they then become unable to capital-
ize on their central position within the network. In the latter
case, the coordination becomes less efficient, because players
having the capacity to search for a more successful strategy
are unable to lead others, which ultimately hinders the suc-
cessful evolution of cooperation.
These details of the described macroscopic dynamics are
generally valid and apply regardless of the properties of the
interaction network and game parametrization. Indeed, as in-
dicated by the results presented in Fig. 2, which were obtained
on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks, it is better if conformists
are selected specifically from those players who have lower
degree or collective influence. On the contrary, if highly in-
fluential players are targeted as conformists and made to fol-
low the majority, then the level of cooperation in the station-
ary state drops significantly. Similarly, as evidenced by the
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FIG. 2: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the fraction ρ
of the population that act as conformists, as obtained on the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random network for different selection rules indicated in the
legend. As for the scale-free network in Fig. 1, here assigning the
conformist status to players with the highest degree (degree) or col-
lective influence (collective) also leads to lower levels of cooperation
than are obtained if the same status is assigned randomly (uniform) or
to low-ranking players (inverse). Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks with
N = 104 nodes and the weak prisoner’s dilemma (T, S) = (1.1, 0)
parametrization have been used. Presented results are averages over
1000 independent realizations.
results presented in Fig. 3 for both the scale-free (left panel)
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random (right panel) networks, even if the
weak prisoner’s dilemma game parametrization is replaced
with the more stringent variant of the same social dilemma,
the targeted selection of conformists amongst the masses still
ensures high levels of cooperation in the stationary state. We
note that, although the level of cooperation might appear to
be modest at first, due to the application of degree-normalized
payoffs, there would actually be almost no cooperators able to
survive without the help of conformity in the consideredT−S
range.
Previous research has also shown that, when we normal-
ize payoffs on heterogeneous interaction network, we destroy
the heterogeneity among players, which drastically weakens
the positive impact of enhanced network reciprocity [72–74].
While this argument is of course valid, it is nevertheless im-
portant to keep in mind that players are still different because
of the remaining differences in degree, and the resulting di-
verse opportunities to spread their strategies. This difference
can be revealed if we choose conformists selectively, by con-
sidering the individual differences of players. As we have
shown, it is detrimental to force leaders into following their
own neighborhood. We note that this observation remains
valid even if we apply less realistic absolute payoff values to
determine strategy imitation probabilities [12]. On the con-
trary, expecting the same conformist attitude from the masses
could be very useful for the whole population. This argument
can be supported indirectly by considering also collective in-
fluence, as recently proposed in [67], instead of the degree. As
can be observed in both Figs. 1 and 2 (see label collective), ex-
ploiting the concept of collective influence to target the most
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FIG. 3: Color-coded fraction of cooperators fC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained when conformists are selected from low-degree
players. Left panel shows the results obtained on scale-free networks, while the right panel shows the results obtained on Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
networks. In both cases the fraction of the population that act as conformists was ρ = 0.7. We note that, in the absence of conformists, and
since we use degree-normalized payoffs, cooperation is practically absent in the depicted T − S range. Networks with N = 104 nodes have
been used, and the presented results are averages over 1000 independent realizations.
influential players as conformists results in the same fall of
cooperation as we have observed when high-degree players
were made to conform.
However, it is also possible to verify the above described
conclusion directly if we distinguish players on regular net-
works or lattices, of course not by means of their degree or
collective influence (because everybody has the same), but by
means of their diverse capacities to pass strategy to the neigh-
bors. In the latter case we apply a player specific prefactor
w to Eq. 1 which characterizes how successfully a player can
deliver a strategy to the other player [68]. To that effect, we
assume that the strategy pass capacity distribution in the popu-
lation is P (w) ∝ w 12 , where wx ∈ [0.01, 1] interval, as show
in the inset of Fig. 4. This practically means that all play-
ers have a minimal chance to spread their strategy (hence we
avoid frozen states), but only a small fraction of the popula-
tion has wx ≈ 1. In this context the former players are the
masses, while the later players are the more influential lead-
ers. Evidently, we can select conformist preferably among the
high-w players (high in Fig. 4) or among the low-w players
(low in Fig. 4). As expected, for small and high ρ values there
is no relevant differences between the two selection rules. In
the former case the impact of conformist players is negligible,
while in the latter case it is too strong (a strategy neutral state
is reached at ρ = 1), either way precluding the observation
of notable differences. In the intermediate region, however,
we can see that higher cooperation levels can be obtained if
conformity-driven players are chosen from low-w group. In
other words, it is better to allow leaders to search for higher
individual payoffs, and in parallel, we should encourage the
masses to conform. If we reverse these roles, leaders loose
their ability to lead, which ultimately weakens network reci-
procity.
Discussion
We have studied the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas where a fraction of the population aspires to con-
form rather than to maximize payoff. Thus, instead of choos-
ing the strategy that is performing best in terms of payoff,
conformists simply choose the strategy that is most prevalent
in their interaction range. We have confirmed that, in gen-
eral, conformity promotes cooperation by enhancing network
reciprocity [16]. More precisely, because the dynamics be-
tween conformity-driven players is conceptually similar to the
so-called majority-voter model [75], the interfaces between
competing domains become smoother, which effectively min-
imizes invasion possibilities for the defectors.
What we have focused on specifically in the present pa-
per is the fact that individuals within a population will typ-
ically be different in terms of the influence they are able to
exert on others. The question then becomes who should con-
form if the goal is a socially desirable evolutionary outcome
with ample cooperation. Should it be leaders, i.e., players
with the highest degree, collective influence, or teaching ac-
tivity, or should it be the masses, i.e., players with the lowest
of these properties? Is it beneficial for the society if lead-
ers tend to follow the masses? Using the simplest alternative,
which is to assign conformists randomly regardless of their
rank, as the benchmark, we have shown that leaders should
not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas. Socially
most favorable outcomes emerge only if the masses conform.
This result is both intuitive as well as easily understandable
in terms of the macroscopic dynamics that conditions it. In
particular, we have argued that forcing the leaders to conform
significantly hinders the constructive interplay between het-
erogeneity and coordination. Leaders must be able to create a
following, which ultimately results in homogenous groups or
clusters competing in the population. This competition is then
swayed in favor of cooperators by the virtue of network reci-
procity, which is further enhanced by smooth(er) interfaces
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FIG. 4: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the fraction ρ
of the population that act as conformists, as obtained on the square
lattice for two different selection rules indicated in the legend. As
in Figs. 1 and 2, here assigning the conformist status to players with
the highest strategy pass capacities (high) leads to lower levels of
cooperation than are obtained if the same status is assigned to play-
ers with the lowest strategy pass capacities (low). Thus, even on
lattices and regular networks (results for random regular graphs are
practically identical), where the rank of a player is determined by a
property not related to the topology of the network, it is clear that
for socially optimal outcomes the conformists should be the masses,
not the leaders. A square lattice with N = 800 × 800 nodes and
the weak prisoner’s dilemma (T, S) = (1.1, 0) parametrization have
been used. Presented results are averages over 10 independent re-
alizations. The inset shows the applied distribution of strategy pass
capacities in the population P (w) ∝ w 12 .
that emerge due to the coordination of conformists. If, on the
contrary, the leaders are made to follow, an unnatural coordi-
nation emerges – the masses are expected to drive coopera-
tion, but their limited interaction range and related weakness
preclude this – which ultimately hinders the successful evolu-
tion of cooperation.
Our results suggest that conformity might have had an
evolutionary origin in that it promotes prosocial behavior.
Although payoff maximization is surely an apt description
of interactions among simpler forms of life, the preference
to conform might also be a good heuristic in social decision
making as it can help to avoid punishment or earn a reward
[76], or it could also be the result of an effort to internalize
the most common strategies among their neighbors. In the
latter case, it could also be a source of an emerging social
norm [77]. Regardless of what the goal of an interaction
is, the present study is a simple example of “multi-target”
evolutionary games, where the diversity of individual targets
one may hope to achieve is mirrored in the array of strategies
one can adopt for each specific purpose. This theoretical
framework offers many possibilities to explore in the future,
such as changing goals over time, considering not only ex-
pected payoffs but also the associated distribution of payoffs
[78], or looking at the coevolution of behavior and cognition
[79]. We conclude with the hope that this paper will help
motivate research along these lines in the near future.
Methods
As the interaction network, we use either homogeneous net-
works with a uniform degree distribution, such as the square
lattice with periodic boundary conditions or random regular
graphs with the same average degree 〈k〉 = 4, or heteroge-
neous graphs including Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks with
average degree 〈k〉 = 6, or Baraba´si-Albert scale-free net-
works with an average degree 〈k〉 = 4. For the generation of
the latter, we implement the standard growth and preferential
attachment algorithm, as described in [80].
In terms of the simulation procedure, we note that each
full Monte Carlo step (MCS) consists of N elementary steps
described above when introducing evolutionary games with
conformists, which are repeated consecutively, thus giving a
chance to every player to change its strategy once on average.
All simulation results are obtained on networks typically com-
prising N = 104 − 105 players. We determine the fraction of
cooperators fC in the stationary state after a sufficiently long
relaxation time lasting up to 105 MCS. To further improve
accuracy, the final results are averaged over up to 5000 in-
dependent realizations, including the generation of scale-free
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, as well as random initial strategy
distributions, for each set of parameter values.
We also note that the results are independent of whether the
assignment of conformity to the fraction ρ of the population is
done only once at the start of the simulation or if conformity
is assigned to players at each instance of the game anew.
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